


E 470
.8
.M61
Copy 1



... ADDRESS OF ...
ENSIGN WILLIAM H. MICHAEL

FORMERLY OF COMPANY B, ELEVENTH IOWA INFANTRY,
AND OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY



COOPERATION BETWEEN
GENERAL GRANT AND
COMMODORE FOOTE . . .
AND BETWEEN . . .
GENERAL GRANT AND
ADMIRAL PORTER . . .



DELIVERED AT THE
BIENNIAL MEETING, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FOUR,
OF CROCKER'S IOWA BRIGADE

E 470
8
M61

By transfer
JUL 23 1907

COOPERATION BETWEEN GRANT AND FOOTE AND GRANT AND PORTER.

A development of this topic will disclose two essential facts; first, that General Grant, at the very inception of hostilities between the North and the South, perceived the absolute need of armed vessels on the Mississippi and its tributaries, and his willingness at all times to accord the Navy its just share of credit for work accomplished; second, that without the cooperation of the Navy it would have been impossible to put down the rebellion under any leadership.

Soon after taking charge of the Western Department Major-General Fremont became convinced of the necessity of preparing a fleet of gunboats for the purpose of acting with the Army and of commanding the Mississippi and its tributaries. The fleet, when it was ready for operation, consisted of twelve gunboats, nine of them ironclad and three wooden vessels. They were flat-bottomed boats and carried, all told, 143 guns—64, 42, and 32 pounders. Many of the guns were old and worthless, and some of the

fixed ammunition supplied the flotilla had been prepared for the Mexican war. The ironclads had been built hurriedly by Capt. James B. Eads, an all-round engineering genius, and the three wooden vessels—*Tyler*, *Lexington*, and *Conestoga*—had been constructed out of towboats at Cincinnati, under the supervision of Capt. John Rogers, of the Navy.*

In September, 1861, Captain Foote, afterwards Rear Admiral, took command of this fleet. He called the naval force a “hybrid service,” which it certainly was. Soon after taking command he added thirty-eight mortar boats, which were simply flat-boats made of solid blocks of timber, without machinery of any kind, and capable of supporting one 13-inch mortar mounted in the center. In August, 1861, when work on the construction of this fleet began, there was no fund out of which to meet the expense, no materials at hand, and no well-defined understanding as to just what the vessels should be, nor whether they should be under the War or the Navy Department. The new force was unlike anything hitherto known, and most of the old army and navy people shook their heads at the proposed experiment. Even the Secretary of the Navy in his annual report referred to it as “anomalous in its character, and its utility regarded by many

*As the war progressed these were added to until the Mississippi squadron numbered more than 100 vessels of all types.

with great incredulity in carrying on hostilities on the river, where it is believed batteries on the banks can easily destroy any kind of boat." This view of the proposed experiment was encouraged by the Engineer Corps, who were presumed by most persons then living to know all the secrets pertaining to effective naval warfare. The very general confidence in this view, however, was somewhat shaken as the war progressed.

To overcome petty interferences with the gun-boat service by subordinate army officers, Captain Foote was made a flag officer with the rank of major-general. This wise action placed him in position to use his own judgment for the most part in directing the movements of his vessels.

Flag Officer Foote formed the acquaintance of General Grant at Cairo, which place became the base of operations for the army and flotilla late in the fall of 1861. About this time Foote wrote to his wife, who was living in New Haven, Conn., and also to his devoted friend, Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, that General Grant was just the kind of man he could work with; that the fullest understanding existed between them; that Grant was a man of good, practical sense, without any pomp, and full of earnest patriotism. At another time he wrote that he and Grant talked over plans of operation as familiarly and as frankly as could two brothers.

THE SITUATION IN THE FALL OF 1861.

When these two men were putting their practical heads together at Cairo in planning a break into the Confederate lines, the situation was about this: The Ohio River formed the northern defensive line of the rebellious States. Kentucky's neutrality was of such a nature as to give free scope to the enemy's operations. The Mississippi River below Columbus was entirely sealed up; in Missouri the rebellion had a strong basis for attack upon the Northwestern States; and, in fact, the rebel line presented an almost unbroken front of fortified posts from the mouth of the Ohio to the mouth of the Potomac. Success in Virginia alone could avail but little to break this line of defense unless at the West it was penetrated and cut in two. Vast masses of Southern troops were concentrated in Tennessee between Nashville and the Mississippi River, and also in eastern Tennessee. How to come at these, and how to project and maintain Northern armies in hostile States, so far from the base of supplies, was a difficult question at that time, and one wholly incapable of solution so long as the great river communications of the West were in the power of the enemy. Such a solution involved the opening and keeping open of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee rivers; Kentucky and Tennessee must be held possession of with firm grasp; Columbus

must be flanked, and the Mississippi River opened to its mouth. It was necessary to solve this problem before a reasonable hope could be entertained that the Federal Government would be able to deal successfully with the rebellion at the West, or with the rebellion at all in its essential strength.

VALUABLE TESTIMONIAL FROM GENERAL GRANT.

On the return of General Grant from his trip around the world, it was my good fortune to be one of a party to meet him at Cheyenne, Wyo., and to ride with him several hours. In the course of a running conversation with the great Captain, I asked him what the army could have done at the beginning of operations from Cairo as a base without the cooperation of the gunboats. After reflecting a few seconds he answered that "it would have been impossible to have achieved any permanent success with the land force then available without such cooperation." He further remarked that in his judgment the Mississippi Valley below Columbus could not have been wrested from the enemy and held without the gunboats, and that the war could have been carried on indefinitely by the Confederates.

SOME PRELIMINARY WORK ACCOMPLISHED.

In pursuance of plans agreed upon between General Grant and Flag Officer Foote the first

operations of the flotilla were chiefly directed to explorations and reconnoissances on the Ohio, Cumberland, and Tennessee rivers. The boats were sent up and down these waters to spy out the positions of the enemy, and when occasion offered to give Confederate camps a taste of what was to come.

The first "scrimmage" was at Lucas Bend, 8 miles below Cairo, where there was an encampment of Confederates whom Grant desired to dislodge. The wooden gunboats *Lexington* and *Conestoga* convoyed the troops sent by Grant, and opened the fight. The enemy had sixteen pieces of field artillery and one rifled gun in battery. Besides these, two rebel gunboats came up from Columbus and took part in the fight. Our gunboats silenced the batteries on land, drove the rebel gunboats under cover of the fortifications at Columbus, and inflicted considerable damage on the cavalry which exposed itself at different points.

The flotilla made excursions up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, destroying rebel camps and making several captures of ferryboats, etc. It thus felt its way to more important results. It spread alarm among the ranks of secessionists along the banks of the rivers and gave new strength to the enfeebled national cause, while at the same time it was gradually finding out its own deficiencies,

discovering its own powers, and securing most valuable information for the Army. This preliminary work included the convoying of troops to Eddyville in October, 1861, where a Confederate camp was completely destroyed and several prisoners and considerable stores were captured.

THE BATTLE OF BELMONT.

General Grant seized Paducah and thus gained a footing near the mouth of the Tennessee River. His headquarters were at Cairo, and his army was rapidly increasing in numbers. November 7 he determined to make demonstrations against Belmont, as it was understood there would soon be a movement of troops from Columbus to cut off Colonel Oglesby, whom he had sent with 3,000 men toward the St. Francis River. The attack was to be made at once in the hope of surprising General Polk's camp at Belmont and preventing that officer from sending reinforcements into Missouri. Grant's force consisted of about 3,000 men, who were embarked on transports, and the *Lexington* and *Conestoga* convoyed them to a point 2 miles above Belmont, where a landing was effected early in the morning. The gunboats engaged the rebel batteries above Columbus and the troops marched to the attack. Grant drove the Confederates from their camp after a severe battle, lasting till noon.

The enemy took refuge under the cover of the heavy guns on the Columbus side. Our little army held the field, and, instead of taking up favorable position under shelter of the gunboats, remained so exposed that heavy reenforcements from Columbus surprised them and nearly cut them off from the transports and gunboats. When this move of the enemy was about to be accomplished, the two gunboats took favorable position and with shrapnel and canister drove the Confederates back with great loss and in confusion. Our troops were reembarked and General Grant was the last man of his little army to cross the gang plank. Under cover of the gunboats the transports headed for Cairo.

The importance of this little fight centers in the fact that it was the first pitched battle of the war in the Mississippi Valley proper, the first battle of the war in which General Grant commanded in person, and the first battle in which any of the gunboats took part. The fact should not be overlooked that the gunboats on this occasion not only rendered a service to the army and to the country in an ordinary sense, but, in view of General Grant's subsequent career, in a more extraordinary sense. A careful study of this battle will justify the conclusion that but for the timely aid rendered by the *Lexington* and *Conestoga* in driving the reenforcements of Polk back at the moment they were crowding our

army to the very water's edge, our troops, including General Grant, would have been captured bodily, or nearly so. The thinking mind will involuntarily speculate as to what effect such a result would have had on the future career of the great General who directed our armies to final victory. It seems to me that by this one achievement, won at the very beginning of the war for the Union, the Mississippi gunboats embalmed themselves in glory and entitled themselves to the lasting gratitude of the nation.

THE CAPTURE OF FORT HENRY.

During one of the expeditions of the gunboats up the Tennessee River, Fort Henry was reconnoitered. As a result of these observations Foote suggested to General Grant the desirability of a combined attack on those works. The General had already doubtless considered the strategic advantage of getting rid of this formidable hindrance to the navigation of the Tennessee, and a plan was quickly agreed upon.

The principal considerations which led to this conclusion grew out of the fact that the first strong line of the rebel defense at the West stretched from the Mississippi River at Columbus to the Cumberland Mountains. It was necessary to break through this at the most feasible point. It could not be

done at Columbus because of the strength of the fortifications and the weakness of our available army in point of numbers and equipment and the frailness of our gunboats. Nor was it deemed practicable to attempt it by sending an army across the Ohio into Kentucky, so far from the base of supplies. Foote and Grant fully agreed that the most feasible if not the only practicable way to break through the line was by capturing the strongholds on the Tennessee and Cumberland, thus effecting an entrance into the Southern line and rendering Columbus and Bowling Green untenable to the enemy. In the event of success the railroad and telegraph communications could be cut and the Confederate line of defense pushed farther down, leaving Kentucky and Tennessee under control of the Union forces.

On January 28, 1862, Foote wrote to Halleck, who had succeeded Fremont, as follows:

General Grant and myself are of the opinion that Fort Henry, on the Tennessee River, can be carried with four ironclad gunboats and troops and be permanently occupied. Have we your authority to move for that purpose when ready?

Two days later Halleck's order to make the movement came and three days later the movement was begun.

The gunboats moved cautiously up the Tennessee, on account of torpedoes or "floating mines," eight of which were fished up near Panther Island.*

McClernand's division moved up the east and Smith's division up the west bank of the river. McClernand was expected to prevent the escape of Confederate troops from Fort Henry to Fort Donelson. The gunboats shelled the woods on both sides as they ascended, to drive off sharpshooters. Everything moved off satisfactorily until the night of the 5th of February, when a severe rain storm set in, flooding the region and making it impracticable for the troops to move artillery. Every little stream was swollen to overflow, making it necessary to build bridges. When the hour arrived for the combined attack the army was not in position as agreed upon, and the gunboats, without the support of the army, began to fire on the fort at 1,700 yards, and continued to work up till within 200 yards, all the time pouring in a deliberate and heavy fire. The battle lasted one hour and twenty minutes, when General Tilghman ordered the Confederate flag lowered, and surrendered his sword and the fort to Flag Officer Foote. The army arrived an hour after the surrender and Foote turned the capture over to Grant.

*These were cylinders of sheet iron, $5\frac{1}{2}$ feet long, pointed at each end, each containing, in a canvas bag, about 75 pounds of powder. A simple apparatus was attached for exploding the mine by means of a percussion cap, to be operated upon by a lever, extending to the outside, to be set off by striking a vessel.

Generals Grant and McClernand, without consulting Foote, showed their appreciation of the work done by the navy under that gallant officer by naming the captured works Fort Foote.

The wooden gunboats immediately after the fall of Fort Henry proceeded up the Tennessee under orders from Foote, given before the battle, in pursuit of Confederate boats and to destroy the drawbridge 25 miles above. The bridge was burned, a half-finished gunboat and several transports were captured and six others burned, immense stores taken, and the river cleared to Muscle Shoals.

On the 14th of February the general assembly of Ohio passed a resolution thanking General Grant and Flag Officer Foote, jointly, for the victory.

CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON.

As soon as Fort Henry fell great efforts were put forth by the Confederates to strengthen Fort Donelson on the Cumberland River, 12 miles from Fort Henry. Russelville and Bowling Green were virtually evacuated, and about 25,000 troops were concentrated at Donelson. The fort was on the west bank of the river, well fortified by an irregular surface, which rose abruptly above the river 150 feet and contained about 100 acres. There were three lines of batteries commanding the river approaches. The lower tier was near the water, the second 50 feet above the first, and the third 50 feet above

the second. These batteries were armed with 32-pounders, 10-inch Columbiads, and one heavy rifled cannon, which carried a 128-pound bolt.

The position was strongly and skillfully fortified on every side, and the enemy had such confidence in its strength that General Floyd wrote to Richmond :

Have no fear about us. The place is impregnable. The enemy can never take it.

The fort was invested and the ironclad *Carondelet* on the 13th of February opened the siege. Single handed she fought the water batteries all day. It was not a general attack, for General Grant, feeling the need of all available force, was awaiting the arrival of the other gunboats and additional troops. Foote was not ready, on account of the absence of mortar boats, which he could have in position within four days, yet at 3 o'clock of the 14th the flotilla, consisting of four ironclads and the three wooden boats, made a direct attack on the water batteries, steaming up boldly within 300 yards of the guns. The plan was to silence the batteries, run by, and enfilade the faces of the forts broadsides. The fight was furious. The upper line was silenced, the men were flying from the lower guns, and the boats were just on the point of shooting by when the rudder chains of the foremost boat were cut away and the *St. Louis*, immediately following,

was disabled by a shot through her pilot house. A rifled gun burst in the third. Foote was wounded and the flotilla was forced to withdraw. The immediate object of the attack was to silence the river batteries and to secure a good position from which to enfilade the Confederate works in cooperation with the assault of the land forces. All this was on the very point of being accomplished when the disasters I have mentioned occurred. The failure was due to the weakness of the boats and the plunging shots from high batteries at short range, rather than any cause attributable to the way the vessels were fought. The demoralizing effect of the bombardment on the enemy was admitted by all.

The fleet got ready to proceed to Cairo for repairs and to bring up the mortar boats to continue the siege. General Grant decided to await their return, and also the coming of reenforcements to his army, but sudden and unlooked-for events brought on a general engagement the next day. Early on the morning of the 15th, sorties made by the enemy, lead by Generals Pillow, Johnston, and Buckner, brought on fierce fighting and for a time menaced the right wing of Grant's army. At this moment the battle hung in the balance, wavering and uncertain. Grant came up in person, and, by a bold inspiration that snatched victory from defeat, ordered General McClernand to retake the hill he

had lost and ordered General Smith to make a simultaneous attack on the enemy's right. Intrenchment after intrenchment was carried, and when night closed the battle for the day Grant realized that the triumph was his. When the sorties were begun, Grant was in consultation with Foote, at the river.

During the progress of the second day's bombardment by the gunboats, when it appeared that success would attend their heavy and persistent fire, General Pillow telegraphed to Governor Harris of Tennessee:

The Federal gunboats are destroying us. For God's sake send us all the help you can immediately. I don't care for the land force of the enemy; they can't hurt us if you can keep those iron hellhounds in check.

I sat at table next to General Buckner in New York City, at a banquet in honor of General Grant's birthday, and I asked him what influence the attack of the flotilla had on the Confederate forces in determining the evacuation and surrender. He said the influence was most demoralizing; that the expectation of another attack the next morning and the fear that the boats would get by and enfilade and cut off retreat had much to do in determining the action adopted. I asked him what the probable effect would have been had the boats got by the batteries. He said they would have been in position

to have destroyed the Confederate army. Foote wrote to his wife:

We ought to have been victorious at Donelson, as we fought harder than at Henry. I went into it against my judgment by order of Halleck. Had I been given time to bring up my mortar boats, we could have compelled the surrender without so great a loss of precious lives.

General McClellan telegraphed Foote:

Sorry you are wounded. Your conduct was magnificent.

A Confederate colonel who was among the captured said that in his opinion "the army never could have taken the fort had it not been for the gunboats." At all events, there was perfect cooperation between Grant and Foote. Three days after the battle, Foote wrote:

Generals Grant and Smith have been to see me to-day. We are all friendly as brothers and I have strong faith and hope, under God, that we now shall have victory upon victory.

On the 11th, two days before the first attack by the gunboats, General Halleck telegraphed Foote:

You have gained great distinction by the capture of Fort Henry. Everybody recognizes your services. Make your name famous in history by the immediate capture of Fort Donelson and Clarksville. The taking of these places is a military necessity. Delay adds strength to them more than to us. Act quickly, even though only half ready. Troops will soon be ready to support you.

GRANT AND FOOTE READY TO PUSH ON TO
NASHVILLE.

The day after the capture of Fort Donelson Halleck telegraphed to Foote:

Push ahead boldly and quickly. Don't delay an instant.

Grant and Foote immediately planned to push on up to Nashville, and but for the interference of Halleck, who suddenly changed the tone of his telegrams to both those officers, they would have captured that city, with its immense military stores, days before it was taken. Johnston wrote that he "fought for Nashville at Donelson." Grant and Foote felt chagrined at not being permitted to carry into execution their plans in regard to East Tennessee and Nashville. The peremptory order of Halleck to Grant was:

Don't let the gunboats go higher than Clarksville; even then they must limit their operations to the destruction of the bridge and return immediately to Cairo, leaving one boat at Fort Donelson.

The gunboats and an army, the latter already embarked on transports, were ready to leave at 4 a. m. on the 21st for Nashville, when Halleck's order came countermanding the proposed movement. Grant was sorely annoyed that the full fruit of the victory at Donelson should not have been gathered. Had it not been for delays in shipping prisoners away, Grant and Foote would have

started at once for Nashville and got there before Halleck's remarkable order was received. Nashville confidently expected Foote would be up immediately with his flotilla, and hence the extraordinary events that took place there, such as the burning of half-built gunboats, the burning of bridges by Floyd's order, and the scampering away of Pillow to the southward.

Had it not been for this unfortunate check, Grant's future operations would have been without doubt by way of Nashville, and a wholly different and undoubtedly more advantageous turn would have been given to the war in the Southwest.

Then followed the famous order* of Halleck to Foote and Grant, of February 25, which made the battle of Shiloh possible, and which directed that two gunboats be left in the Tennessee River to cooperate with Grant.

Federal success in Tennessee had served to isolate the enemy's stronghold at Columbus and to render it untenable; and within a few days after

* ST. LOUIS, February 25, 1862.—To Commodore Foote, Cairo: The possession of Nashville by General Buell renders it necessary to countermand the instructions sent to Foote and Sherman yesterday morning, dated 23d. Grant will send no more forces to Clarksville; General Smith's division will come to Fort Henry, or to a point higher up on the Tennessee River; transports will be collected at Paducah and above; all the mortar boats to be immediately brought back to Cairo; two gunboats to be left at Clarksville, to precede Nelson's division up the river to Nashville—having done this, they will return to Cairo; two gunboats to be left in the Tennessee River with General Grant; the latter will immediately have small garrisons detailed for Forts Donelson and Henry, and all other forces made ready for the field.—H. W. HALLECK, Major-General.

the reassembling of the ironclads at Cairo this strong position was evacuated. The *Tyler* and *Lexington* went up the Tennessee to cooperate with General Grant, while Foote in person moved against Island No. 10 in cooperation with Pope.

THE GUNBOATS SERVE GRANT AT SHILOH.

Opportunity for the gunboats to serve Grant and his army much in the same manner as at Belmont soon presented itself at Shiloh. It is unnecessary to recite here the bloody struggle of Sunday, April 6, at Pittsburg Landing. Early in the day it was impossible for the gunboats to aid Grant and his brave men in their struggle, but later in the day the opportunity came. General Grant says: "At a late hour in the afternoon a desperate attempt was made to turn our left and get possession of the landing, transports, etc. This point was guarded by the gunboats, and in repulsing the enemy much is due to them." Unfortunately he does not say how much. Those who met the terrific and maddened onslaught of the enemy on the left, and who know that they could not have maintained their position without the aid of the gunboats, are surely competent to testify. General Hurlburt, who commanded on the extreme left, in his report, says:

From my own observation and the statement of prisoners, the fire of the gunboats was most effectual in stopping the advance of the enemy on Sunday afternoon and night.

Beauregard says in his report:

The enemy broke and sought refuge behind a commanding eminence covering Pittsburg Landing, not more than a half mile distant, under cover of the gunboats, which kept up a fierce and annoying fire with shot and shell of the heaviest description.

He gives as the reason for his army being unable to withstand the onslaught of our army the next day that "during the night after the first day's fighting the enemy broke the men's rest by a discharge, at measured intervals, of heavy shells thrown from the gunboats." In another part of his report he refers to the Union army as "sheltered by such an auxiliary as their gunboats."

The next day after the battle Lieutenant Gwin, commanding the division of gunboats on the Tennessee River, called upon General Grant, aboard of the latter's headquarters boat. The General, though quite lame from the injury he had received by the fall of his horse, walked down the steps to the forecastle and received the Lieutenant in person. They shook hands and Gwin said: "I want to congratulate you, General, on winning this great victory." "Well," replied the General, "I am not sure that the army is entitled to as much credit as the navy."

In his memoirs General Grant says:

The navy gave a hearty support to the army at Shiloh, as indeed it always did both before and subsequently, when I was in command.

After the battle of Shiloh, Halleck assumed command and Grant was utterly ignored, as he says himself in his memoirs. When General Grant resumed command of the forces in Tennessee he immediately planned a campaign against Vicksburg. This brought him again in touch with the Navy, and his cooperation with it continued more or less intimately till the close of the war. I shall be able, however, to refer to only a few instances of this cooperation, but these will illustrate how hearty and cordial it was.

THE GUNBOATS AT ISLAND NO. 10, FORT PILLOW,
AND MEMPHIS.

A few words will bring the work of the flotilla under Foote and Davis down to the renewal of active cooperation between Grant and the gun-boats. The capture of Island No. 10 was made possible by the brilliant passage of the *Carondelet* and the *Pittsburg*, under cover of darkness and furious thunder storms. These boats silenced the batteries below the island and covered the crossing of Pope's forces, which were enabled thereby to bag the Confederate army of over 7,000 men. The island surrendered to Foote. Then followed the operations and naval fight at Fort Pillow, in which we were successful; the withdrawal of Pope's army by Halleck; the naval battle before Memphis, which

resulted in the complete destruction of the Confederate fleet by our flotilla; and the fight of the *Mound City* with a battery at St. Charles, on the White River. This completed the work of opening the Mississippi to Vicksburg, which was never again closed.

RÉSUMÉ OF ACHIEVEMENTS DURING THE YEAR.

A fair résumé of the achievements of the navy in the West during the year would be that a flotilla had been created which saved Grant and his army at Belmont; had, unaided, captured Fort Henry; had cooperated with Grant and his army in the capture of Donelson; had saved Grant's left at Shiloh from being turned, on the first day of the battle, and demoralized Beauregard's army during the night, so that it was unfitted for service the following day; had challenged the admiration of the world by its dramatic passage of Island No. 10, which determined the fate of the island and of the Confederate army confronting Pope; had destroyed the Confederate fleet at Memphis; had cooperated in the capture of St. Charles, which practically opened the Mississippi to Vicksburg, and thus transferred the most important operations from the outskirts to the very heart of the Confederacy.

OPERATIONS AGAINST VICKSBURG.

The way was now prepared for General Grant's advance by land and water upon Vicksburg, which, if taken, would completely divide the Confederacy and cut off its largest and richest sources of supplies.

Admiral Foote had been compelled to give up his command of the flotilla on account of the effects of the wound he had received at Donelson, and Davis, who had succeeded him, had been relieved by Admiral David D. Porter, who took command in October, 1862. Porter had placed the gun-boats in excellent repair, had added a few new vessels, and informed General Grant that he was ready to cooperate with him in any way possible. Grant had determined to make an attack on Vicksburg, and he made a visit to Cairo to arrange with Porter for the cooperation of the navy. He arrived one night when a supper was being given to Admiral Porter and his officers by Quartermaster McAllister. Supper had been served when Captain McAllister ushered in a travel-worn man, who was introduced immediately to Porter as General Grant. The two, who had never met before, repaired to a table by themselves, and within thirty minutes a plan of cooperation was agreed upon. Grant stated that General Joe Johnston was near Vicksburg with 40,000 men; that he would "march directly against Johnston and Vicksburg; Johnston will meet me

with his army reenforced by as many men as can possibly be taken from Pemberton. It is my purpose to hold Johnston at Grenada while Sherman and the gunboats make a landing on the Yazoo. The weakened garrison at Vicksburg will not be strong enough to resist you and Sherman and the latter will be able to get inside of the works. When this shall have been accomplished, I will force Johnston out of Grenada and back on Vicksburg."

It required but few moments, as I have said, for Grant to unfold this plan to Porter, and the latter informed the General that he would be able to move next day. Grant said that Sherman would have 30,000 men ready to embark at Memphis by the time the gunboats arrived there. Without partaking of food or drink, Grant withdrew and returned to Holly Springs that night. This was the beginning of the campaign against Vicksburg.

Porter informs us that he broke up the supper by ordering his officers to their boats, and preparations were begun for a movement of the fleet the next day. The seven ironclads reached the Yazoo a day or so in advance of Sherman's army and had carried out Porter's orders in clearing the river of torpedoes as far up as was necessary. In doing this, however, the *Cairo* was blown up and sunk. The way for the landing of the troops was accomplished, but owing to the unexpected strength of

the defenses and the incessant rains and depth of the mud it was found impossible for the army to gain a position that promised success, and the troops were withdrawn. Grant had drawn Pemberton with a large force from the defenses about Vicksburg, just as he had planned to do, and the gunboats had cleared the Yazoo for the landing of Sherman's army, but what happened to Grant's rear and to Sherman's front made the campaign a failure. Of course there were some advantages gained, but on the whole the plan failed.

The next move was on Arkansas Post, an iron-casemated fort located on the Arkansas River. The gunboats attacked the fort, and within three hours the eleven heavy guns in the works were disabled and the garrison surrendered to the navy. The Confederate troops, numbering about 6,000, surrendered to the army.

The gunboats and the army returned to Vicksburg, and soon after Grant took command in person of the entire army operating against that stronghold. The hearty cooperation between Grant and Porter in the reduction of Vicksburg is well known to all. Every expedient to get into the rear of Vicksburg by the army was made in conjunction with the navy; aye, not one of them would have been attempted without the cooperation of the gunboats.

The Yazoo Pass and Deer Creek expeditions, two of the most daring and novel experiments ever attempted in military and naval operations, were jointly conducted, and the final one, which proved successful—that of running the batteries—was a perfect cooperation between the army and navy. The gunboats kept the communications of the army open; prevented every effort to furnish reinforcements to Pemberton from the trans-Mississippi country; effectually shut off supplies from the same source; and kept up a destructive bombardment of the city until the surrender.

THE GUNBOATS HELPED SHERMAN OVER THE TENNESSEE RIVER.

The last cooperation between Grant and the gunboats in the West was in helping Sherman and his army over the Tennessee River on their way to join Grant at Chattanooga. The floods made it impossible for the army to cross and compelled it to go into camp at Muscle Shoals until a fall of the water. By the foresight of Porter, who had not been advised officially of the march, a fleet of light-draft vessels was hurried up the river to meet Sherman and render him such aid as he might need. By this happy foresight on the part of Porter, Sherman reached Chattanooga in time to take a prominent part in the victory. It can not be well determined

what the result of the battle would have been had Sherman's army been longer delayed by the high water. The army and navy in the West were a constant help to each other. In fighting on inland waters each was a necessity to the other, and it may be said that by reason of the good sense and high patriotism of the men who directed the land forces and the naval forces in that quarter the most perfect cooperation was assured. The fruit of this cooperation was a series of victories in quick succession to the Federal arms, which foretold final triumph of the Union cause.

COOPERATION TO THE LAST.

Grant was made Lieutenant-General and was given command of the armies. He established his headquarters in the East and very soon began his great campaign against Lee. The gunboats on western rivers continued efficient cooperation with troops operating there. The Mississippi was traversed from Cincinnati to New Orleans, and expeditions were sent against the enemy wherever he could be found. When Sherman began his march to the sea, the Navy made it absolutely impossible for Kirby Smith to send reenforcements against him, and the Navy awaited his arrival on the coast. When Thomas finally moved against Hood, the ubiquitous mosquito boat was on hand to support

him and to baffle the enemy in his effort to cross the Cumberland, and, but for low water in the Tennessee, would have intercepted his retreat till Thomas could have captured the bulk of his demoralized army.


To complete the effectiveness of the blockade, it was necessary to capture Fort Fisher. The first step taken in this direction was the transfer of Admiral Porter from the West to the East. Grant and Porter knew each other fully, and Grant thought he needed his old friend and coworker with him. Accordingly Porter was assigned to the command of the North Atlantic Squadron. Soon after the transfer the joint attack on Fort Fisher was planned and successfully carried out; the reduction of Wilmington followed, which necessitated the evacuation of Forts Anderson and Strong. Porter sent vessels up as far as Fayetteville, where Sherman was to pass. Every inlet was closed; the Confederacy was practically sealed up; and the European powers, which had sneered at our Navy and scouted our ability to blockade effectually 3,000 miles of coast line, now recognized the effectiveness of the blockade—and to them this blockade is considered the great achievement of the war.

Every wish of Grant was met by the Navy. Porter kept near him and his army on the James and was there in company with the immortal

Lincoln when the surrender of Lee and the collapse of the Confederacy finally came.

During the war Iowa had the distinction of furnishing the chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs of the Senate in the person of Senator Grimes, who was the peer of any member of that body. The achievements of the gunboats under Flag Officer Foote at Belmont, Forts Henry and Donelson, and at Memphis aroused the great Senator's enthusiastic appreciation and admiration. In a speech, remarkable for its eloquence and effect, delivered on the floor of the Senate, he said:

I am anxious that the people of this entire country may feel that the exploits of the Navy, wherever performed, are their exploits; that its glory is their glory; and that while they are taxing themselves to support it they are supporting the right arm of the national defense. I desire the citizen of the most remote frontier to feel that he is equally protected and equally honored by the brave deeds of our naval officers with the citizens of the Atlantic coast. I wish the men of Iowa and Minnesota to know that they are as effectually defended in their liberties at home and in their honor abroad by the achievements of Dupont and Goldsborough and Stringham and Foote on the water as they can be by any victories won by our armies on the land.



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS



0 013 673 643 7